(Dis)solving the Chronological Paradox in Customary International Law: A Hartian Approach
As traditionally conceived, the creation of customary international law gives rise to the following chronological paradox. In order to create a new rule of customary international law, states must act from the belief that the law already requires the conduct specified in the rule.
1 Yet until they have successfully created the new rule of customary law, the conduct in question is not legally required. Thus the development of a new rule of customary international law appears to be impossible.
Francois Geny suggests one way to avoid the chronological paradox, namely that states falsely believe that the law already requires the conduct specified by the nascent rule. 2 In section I, I consider Geny's solution to the chronological paradox, and a recent criticism of it by Michael Byers. 3 I contend that Byers's criticism rests on misunderstandings regarding both the nature of a legal system and the nature of customary law formation, and so fails as a response to Geny. Yet Geny, too, fails to grasp correctly the nature of customary law formation, and so he offers as a necessary condition for the creation of a new customary rule what is only one possible means by which such a rule may come to exist. Moreover, like all those who assert the existence of the chronological paradox, Geny conflates the process of customary rule formation with the process by which such rules become legally valid.
In section II, I argue that the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires a two-step process; first, the development of a new customary rule, and second, the incorporation of that rule into international law. The chronological paradox results from the conflation of these two steps. Once we draw the appropriate conceptual distinction, the chronological paradox dissolves. Confusion over this distinction arises, I
conclude, because in the international legal system, the same agents whose beliefs give rise to the new customary rule are the legal officials whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that new rule legally valid.
The proposed solution to the chronological paradox employs H.L.A. Hart's analysis of the concepts of law and a legal system, and in particular, the idea of a rule of
recognition. Yet Hart denied the existence of an international rule of recognition. Hart's argument for this conclusion, and so his belief that in certain respects international law remains a primitive legal order, are set out in section III. I also consider there the attempts by Anthony D'Amato, Thomas Franck, and G.J.H. van Hoof to refute Hart's doubts concerning international law, and argue that none succeed. In fact, none of these theorists appear to grasp the primary reason behind Hart's skepticism with respect to the existence of an international rule of recognition.
In section IV, I offer a novel argument for the existence of a rule of recognition at the base of customary international law. This argument turns on a distinction between the ontological and authoritative resolution functions of a rule of recognition, a distinction Hart elides. If successful, the view described in this section demonstrates that customary international law does rest on a rule of recognition, albeit one that does not serve the authoritative resolution function, and so the proposed solution to the chronological paradox rests on a secure foundation.
I
The chronological paradox arises only if states must truly believe the law already requires the conduct specified in some rule in order for that rule to become part of international 3 law. 4 One obvious way to defuse the paradox, then, is to argue that in order to create a new rule of customary international law, states must falsely believe that the conduct specified in the nascent customary rule is already legally required. This solution,
proposed by Francois Geny, keeps to the letter of the opinio juris sive necessitates requirement, as traditionally conceived, since those states contributing to the creation of a new customary rule believe that their conduct is already legally required. At the same time, it avoids the chronological paradox by acknowledging that during the period of creation, this belief on the part of states will be false. Thus the creation of a new customary legal rule does not in fact require the impossibility that the rule in question already be part of existing customary international law.
Michael Byers finds Geny's proposed solution to the chronological paradox unsatisfactory, 'because it is inconceivable that an entire legal process -and since the customary process provides the basis for the law of treaties, an entire legal systemcould be based on a persistent misconception.' 5 Byers's criticism rests, however, on two misunderstandings. First, he fails to distinguish carefully between two types of conventional rules that partly constitute the international legal system: (1) the conventional rule of recognition employed by officials to determine whether particular norms are legally valid (i.e. norms of the international legal system), and (2) primary rules of customary international law. 6 Second, Byers errs in asserting that Geny's proposal entails a persistent misconception on the part of states that they are bound by a rule of customary law (or the rule of recognition). This claim evidences a lack of understanding with respect to the nature of conventional rules. I develop each of these points in turn.
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Following Hart, I suggest we understand a legal system to consist in the union of primary and secondary rules, where primary rules address the behavior of subjects in the legal system (e.g. what they ought to do), while secondary rules address the behavior of officials in that legal system (e.g. instructing officials as to what counts as a rule of the legal system). 7 Byers suggests that the entire international legal system rests on the 'customary process,' with the implication that the opinio juris requirement applies even to the most basic rule of the international legal system -the rule in virtue of which all other rules count as legal, or what Hart calls the rule of recognition. But even if opinio juris is a necessary condition for the creation of primary rules of customary international law, it cannot be a condition for the creation or existence of the conventional rule of recognition employed by officials in the international legal system. This is so because in order for a given norm to qualify as a norm of the international legal system it must be validated by the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition cannot validate itself, however, and so there can be no legal obligation to adhere to the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition is not itself law, but rather a conventional rule that makes law possible. 8 In subscribing to the rule of recognition that is the basis of the international legal system, then, officials cannot correctly believe this rule to be law; such a belief is conceptually incoherent. Thus even if correct, Geny's solution to the chronological paradox would not entail that the entire international legal system had its basis in a 'persistent misconception' on the part of legal officials.
Of course, it may be that neither international law as a whole, nor customary international law, constitutes a legal system; one united by a rule of recognition. Rather, it may it be comprised only of a set of legal norms; this is Hart's view, as will become while all the other members of S do not believe in the existence of R, then A and B believe falsely. However, if at some later time t2, C, D, E, etc. also come to believe in the existence of R, so that all or almost all members of S believe in R, then A and B will no longer err when they believe that they have an obligation to φ in virtue of R.
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Crucially, A and B having a false belief that R applies to members of S can be part of the mechanism whereby a sufficient number of members of S come to believe in R so that it really does apply to members of S. There is nothing conceptually problematic, then, in basing the creation of customary rules on actors falsely believing that such rules already exist. It is true that the existence of customary rules cannot be based on a false belief -that is, on a persistent misconception -but contrary to Byers's claim, Geny's solution to the chronological paradox does not entail such a conclusion.
6 Nevertheless, we ought to reject Geny's solution for two reasons. First, he treats as a necessary condition for the creation of a new customary rule what is only a sufficient condition, in certain circumstances, for the creation of such a rule. While the having of (initially) false beliefs in the existence of some customary rule R may be one way to bring about a state of affairs in which a sufficient number of members of some society S believe in the existence of R (and act accordingly) so that R is a customary rule in S, it is not the only way to bring about this state of affairs. We can imagine a case in which R has been imminent in the practices of members of S, and all (or at least most) of its members come to believe in the existence of R at the same time. While the rule is only imminent, no member of S believes in its existence, and since all members of S come to believe in it at the same time, none of them ever believes falsely in R's existence.
Alternatively, at t1 A and B may believe that R ought to be a rule for members of S, and believe that the best way to bring such a rule into existence is to act as if R already exists and applies to members of S. 10 Their appeals to R to justify their own behavior, and to criticize others, may lead to the widespread adoption of R by other members of S, so that A and B no longer need believe that they ought to act as if R exists, but instead act on the now true belief that R really does exist. As set out, this scenario does not require that A and B ever hold a false belief regarding the existence of R, and yet it seems quite plausible to think that a new customary rule could come to exist as the result of such a process.
The second reason to reject Geny's solution to the chronological paradox is that he fails to distinguish the process whereby a customary rule comes to exist, and the process whereby that rule comes to be law. As I demonstrate in the next section, once we 7 draw this distinction we can dissolve the chronological paradox, rather than attempt, as
Geny does, to tweak the traditional understanding of the requirements for the creation of a new rule of customary international law.
II
Most international legal theorists subscribe to the view that the creation of a new rule of customary international law requires both state practice and opinio juris sive necessitates;
the belief that the law requires the practice in question. Byers writes that 'it is clear that something in addition to State practice should be necessary for customary international law, for it is essential that one be able to distinguish between legally binding rules and patterns of behavior which are not legally required.' 11 This remark illustrates exactly the confusion upon which the chronological paradox rests. For it conflates two separate conceptual distinctions that must be drawn: the first is that between rule-guided behavior and non-rule-guided behavior, while the second is between legal and non-legal rules.
While both distinctions turn on the beliefs had by certain agents, the beliefs in question differ, and at least as a conceptual matter, the agents who must hold the beliefs can also diverge.
Customary international law consists in customary rules. The first conceptual question we must address, then, is what distinguishes convergent behavior that results from adherence to a rule from convergent behavior that results from habit, or an overlap of interests. Once again, Hart provides the answer: the convergent behavior of various agents reflects the existence of a social rule when most of those agents take an internal point of view with respect to that behavior. 12 Agents adopt such a point of view when they believe that they ought to conform their behavior to a certain standard, such that 8 behavior that deviates from the standard warrants criticism, and appeal to the standard provides a sufficient justification for behavior that conforms to it. These normative elements are absent in cases where convergent behavior results from habit, or an overlap of interests. So for example, regular riders on a bus may sit in the same seats out of habit.
Should one of them choose to sit in a different seat, however, she will not necessarily be criticizable for doing so. Likewise, the interests of different homeowners in diverse types of flowers that happen to complement one another may result in a beautiful neighborhood. But if one homeowner elects to plant non-complementary flowers, she will not be criticizable for doing so, or at least not on the grounds that she has deviated from a rule governing the planting of flowers in this neighborhood. 13 In contrast, a person who refuses to return to the dugout after the umpire has called a third strike on her is liable to criticism, and crucially that criticism involves her failure to adhere to the conventional rules of baseball.
Agents' adoption of the internal point of view enables us to distinguish ruleguided behavior from convergent behavior that merely reflects habit or overlapping
interests. Yet the existence of a customary (or social) rule is only a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the creation of a new rule of customary international law. For even if there exist customary rules that govern a particular domain of state conduct, it does not follow necessarily that the customary rules in question are legal ones. For instance, ceremonial salutes at sea and the practice of exempting diplomatic vehicles from parking prohibitions are both governed by non-legal customary rules. 14 Rather, what makes customary rules international law is adherence by officials in the 9 international legal system to a rule of recognition that takes custom to be a source of valid law (at least with respect to certain domains of conduct).
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The rule of recognition directs officials in a legal system to declare certain norms legally valid, and so ones that ought to be adhered to by subjects of the legal system, and applied by officials to settle disputes. Like customary rules concerned with agents' conduct, the rule of recognition is a social rule. It exists and has the content it does only as long as officials in the legal system adopt the internal point of view with respect to it; that is, only as long as legal officials appeal to the rule to justify their conduct (qua officials), and as a basis for criticizing legal officials who deviate from it (in their capacity as legal officials). Thus a second necessary condition for the creation of a new rule of customary international law is that the rule of recognition followed by officials in the international legal system treat customary rules (at least in some domains of conduct)
as legally valid. Together, a customary rule and this rule of recognition are jointly sufficient for the existence of a rule of customary international law.
With a clearer conceptual understanding of the process whereby a new rule of customary international law comes to exist, we can now dissolve the chronological paradox. As a conceptual matter, the agents whose beliefs in the existence of a customary rule are necessary for the existence of that rule need not overlap at all with the agents whose beliefs in the existence of a rule of recognition (that treats custom as a source of law) are necessary for the legal validity of that customary rule. We can imagine, for example, a society whose legal officials live in isolation from their subjects, but subscribe to a rule of recognition that directs them to validate the society's customary rules as law. These officials have no part in the creation of the customary rule; indeed, qua customary rule, they may not be subject to it at all. But it is only in virtue of these officials' adherence to the rule of recognition specified above that the customary rule becomes law. Likewise, while the remaining members of this society play a necessary role in the creation of the rule, they are powerless to make that rule legally valid. Since they are not legal officials, even their belief that the rule is law does not suffice to make it so. 16 As this imagined scenario illustrates, the creation of a new rule of customary law (international or domestic) does not require any agent to believe that her conduct is already legally required. 17 Nor does the chronological paradox reappear at the level of customary rule formation, since as I argued in the previous section, the development of a new customary rule does not require that those whose beliefs are instrumental in such a process already believe that their conduct is required by a rule.
Why, then, have so many international legal theorists thought that the creation of new norms of customary international law suffers from the chronological paradox? A likely answer is that they have been misled by the fact that, in the international legal system, states comprise both the primary actors whose conduct and beliefs give rise to the existence of a any customary rule, and the vast majority of the officials in the international legal system whose adherence to the rule of recognition leads them to deem that rule legally valid. 18 It is easy to conflate the two distinct conceptual claims:
(1) the development of a new customary rule requires that states (in their capacity as members of the society of states) believe in the existence of such a rule and (2) in order for a customary rule to be law, states (in their capacity as officials of the international legal system) must believe that it is law into the single claim (3) the development of a new customary rule of international law requires that states believe the rule to already be law.
This claim, of course, entails the chronological paradox. While the dual roles played by states in the international legal system may be the cause of the mistaken belief in this paradox, it is important to note that the problem is a conceptual one. As I have demonstrated here, once we draw the appropriate conceptual distinctions, the chronological paradox will trouble us no more.
III
The solution to the chronological paradox presented in the previous section rests on Hart frames his discussion of an international rule of recognition as a response to
Kelsen. 19 Specifically, Hart rejects Kelsen's insistence that any legal order, and in particular the international legal order, must have a Grundnorm, a rule that (1) functions to validate all other rules as rules of the legal order in question, (2) unifies these rules in a single system, and (3) makes possible the existence of obligation creating rules. With regard to the last of these functions alleged to show the necessity of a Grundnorm, Hart argues that the existence of obligation creating rules amongst a group of actors requires only that those actors adopt the internal point of view with respect to certain standards of conduct, a state of affairs that can obtain in the absence of any 'basic norm.' He also argues that it is quite possible for a legal order to consist of a mere set of rules, without there being any secondary rule of recognition that unites them into a system of rules.
This claim entails the falsity of the second reason Kelsen gives for the necessity of a Kelsen's proposed rule as a Hartian rule of recognition, rather than as Grundnorm.
Having undermined both Kelsen's theory of international law and his proposed
Grundnorm for the international legal order, Hart brings his discussion of international law to a close with the claim that though 'different interpretations of the phenomena to be observed are of course possible… it is submitted that there is no basic rule providing general criteria of validity for the rules of international law.' 22 Though Hart endorses
Bentham's assessment that international law is sufficiently analogous in content to municipal law to warrant being labeled law, in its form or structure international law remains a primitive social order. Hart's analysis of a rule of recognition cannot cope with the possibility that those who exercise the authority conferred by the rule will abuse it. 26 This is only a problem, however, if it is assumed that a legal obligation to φ entails a moral obligation to φ. Hart explicitly denies the necessity of such an implication. Even if those empowered to create law by the rule of recognition in a given legal system choose to create morally problematic laws, such "abuse" need not result in immoral consequences, particularly amongst a population well-schooled in Hart's legal theory. 27 Moreover, the kind of abuse D'Amato has in mind -a legislator changing or manipulating the rule of recognition at whim -are extremely unlikely, if not impossible, in a legal system with any significant number of legal officials. In such a legal system, the rule of recognition will depend on a consensus amongst most legal officials, and so no single legislator (or judge, etc.) will be capable of changing the rule herself. given norm imposes obligations when the relevant actors adopt the internal point of view toward it, that is, when they appeal to the norm as a sufficient justification for conduct that conforms to the norm, and for criticizing those whose conduct deviates from the norm. But as was just noted, Hart is quite clear that it does not follow from the (social)
fact that an agent has a legal obligation to comply with a given norm that she has a moral obligation, or indeed any reason at all, to comply with that norm. But even if these ambiguities regarding the concepts of obligation and legitimacy are left aside, nowhere does Hart make the claim that agents are more likely to adopt the internal point of view with respect to a social norm (such as a law) if that norm is endorsed by a rule of recognition. In fact, the one rule in a legal system to which actors (or at least officials) must adopt the internal point of view is the one that cannot be given a greater 'pull to compliance' through validation by a rule of recognition, namely the rule of recognition itself.
Consider another of Franck's attempts to characterize Hart's theory of law, and the role a rule of recognition plays in it.
In his [Hart's] view, a simple rule ("cross on the green, stop on the red") may arise as a discrete obligation entered into consensually by an otherwise unassociated group of actors: for example, random pedestrians and motorists. But that obligation's compliance pull would be enhanced if the traffic rule has been made by a city council organized in accordance with a state constitution which, itself, is a valid exercise of powers allocated to the state by the national constitution. Primary obligations such as those imposed by the traffic rule may come into operation as mere reciprocal arrangements, lacking adherence to a system of secondary rules about how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied. Such ad hoc rules are not necessarily incapable of obligating parties which have agreed to abide by them. But rules which adhere to a hierarchy of secondary rules are of a higher order of obligation because they can exert a pull toward compliance even on parties which have not specifically agreed to comply. The basis of an obligation created by a primary rule which is reinforced by a rule hierarchy is not specific consent but status.
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This paragraph contains the same problems as those identified previously: ambiguity with respect to the concept of obligation, and the attribution to secondary rules, including the rule of recognition, of a normativity generating power that Hart does not assign them.
But it evidences an additional misunderstanding of Hart's view as well.
Franck places great weight here (and elsewhere) on the distinction between specific consent or agreement on the one hand, and status as a member of the community on the other, as a basis for being bound by law. Apparently he believes that a rule of recognition is both necessary and sufficient for the latter being a possible source of obligation. Hart would deny this, however. Conceptually, nothing prevents an agent from becoming bound by a primary norm even if she has not specifically consented to it, and this is so even if no rule exists in the community for identifying what the law is, and 20 for systematizing it -that is, even in the absence of a rule of recognition as Hart conceives of it. Primary rules (and even some secondary rules, such as rudimentary norms of contract) exist and apply to all members of a community as long as most of its members believe they do. It is consensus, not consent, that provides the basis for social norms; that is why new entrants to the community (agents born into it, or newly created states) are automatically bound by these norms, regardless of whether they agree to be.
Of course, the consensus amongst a given group of agents may be that certain norms are binding only on those who specifically consent to them; but whether this is so, and for what norms, is a contingent matter that will likely vary from community to community.
Nor is a rule of recognition, as Hart understands it, necessary to define membership in the community. Membership does depend on a consensus within a group regarding who counts as a member; but such a consensus can exist even in the absence of any mechanism for authoritatively resolving who is, and who is not, a member of the community. Of course, except in the conditions that Hart describes as necessary for the survival of a primitive social order (e.g. ties of kinship and a stable environment), uncertainty is likely to arise regarding the exact criteria for membership, which may well lead in turn to disruptions of social order. A rule of recognition will help to address this defect, but it is not necessary for the existence of any community at all, even a community of groups or collective agents. 35 It is important to note the exact nature of the criticisms leveled here against 43 Hart may well have been more concerned with differentiating his theory of law from Kelsen's -that is, with a theoretical debate -than with the particular question of international law.
Given that aim, establishing the possibility of a legal order without a Grundnorm or rule of recognition was a far more important task than establishing whether there was (or is)
an international rule of recognition.
But even if this explains why Hart does not make any effort to examine the practices constitutive of international law for signs of a rule of recognition, it does not justify his bald assertion that 'there is no basic rule providing general criteria of validity for the rules of international law, and… the rules which are in fact operative constitute not a system but a set of rules…' 44 Yet Hart's claim is not mere assertion, as van Hoof would have it. For though Hart does not take on the extremely difficult task of proving a negative -in this case, the non-existence of an international rule of recognition -he does provide a crucial reason for thinking that no search will turn up such a rule. According to
Hart, a legal order rests on a rule of recognition only when there are criteria for settling what the law is other than the current beliefs of those subject to the laws. Insofar as the existence and scope of international legal norms is simply and entirely a matter of consensus amongst states, as international legal positivists assert, it appears to follow that the international legal order does not rest on a rule of recognition. Van Hoof may be right, then, to describe Hart's claim as a presumption, rather than a conclusion.
Nevertheless, it appears to be a presumption that international legal theorists, or at least those persuaded of the truth of Hart's legal positivism, have good reason to take seriously.
To reiterate, Hart's assertion that there is no international rule of recognition rests on a conceptual point regarding the necessary conditions for the existence of such a rule, together with a widely (though not unanimously) accepted view of international law.
Among the passages providing textual support for this claim is Hart's remark that, were it generally recognized that certain treaties bind even those states not party to them, such treaties would in fact be legislative enactments and international law would have distinct criteria of validity for its rules. A basic rule of recognition could then be formulated which would represent an actual feature of the system and would be more than an empty restatement of the fact that a set of rules are in fact observed by states.
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Van Hoof interprets this statement as implying that a rule of recognition exists only insofar as a legislature does, a far more restrictive understanding than Hart employs when he first introduces the concept of a rule of recognition. 46 Hart's remark does not have the implication van Hoof believes it does, however. Rather, it depicts one possible, but not necessary, change to the international legal order that would suffice for the existence of an international rule of recognition. 47 Seen in the context of other remarks Hart makes in his rebuttal of Kelsen's theory of international law, what Hart's statement does imply is that a legal order has no rule of recognition if the legal validity of a norm is solely a matter of its acceptance as law by most of those subject to it. The significance of states being legally bound by treaties to which they are not parties lies in the possibility of a norm being legally valid even if it is not thought to be so by those subject to it, just as in a municipal legal system the legal validity of a norm does not depend on the belief of most, or even all, of the persons subject to it.
Like D'Amato and Franck, van Hoof fails to provide a convincing rebuttal to
Hart's claim that the international legal order lacks a rule of recognition. Equally important is that all three miss the primary source of Hart's skepticism, namely that a rule of recognition exists only where there is an authoritative procedure in place for settling disputes over what the law is (including the exact scope of specific legal norms). In the next section, I argue that serving this function is not essential for the existence of a rule of recognition, and contend that existing international law, and more specifically, customary international law, can and does have a rule of recognition at its base. Suppose that the United Kingdom offers as a justification for its vote its belief that state A has not acted illegally because its conduct conforms to a norm that is legal because it is just. That is, the U.K. justifies its vote by appeal to the belief that the substantive justice of the norm suffices for that norm's legal validity. Surely much of the criticism directed 28 at the U.K. would involve substantive arguments concerning the justice of this particular intervention, the effects that a rule legalizing interventions of this type would have on international peace and stability, and so on. I suggest, however, that the U.K. would also be criticized for deviating from the existing shared normative practice governing the legal validation of norms, namely the recognition of norms as legally valid by most states. In other words, the U.K. would be criticized for deviating from the international rule of recognition (at least as concerns customary international law, and perhaps also treaty law), and those who made the criticism would take the fact of deviation from this rule to be a sufficient reason for criticizing the U.K.; that is, a reason to criticize the U.K.
IV
independent of any substantive concerns regarding justice or international peace and stability.
Of course it is possible to criticize those who object to the U.K.'s deviation; that is, to argue that the U.K. (and other states) ought not to adhere to the rule of recognition that forms the basis of customary international law because adherence to a different rule of recognition would lead to more substantively just outcomes. But the existence of a rule of recognition does not turn on whether such a rule, and the legal order to which it gives rise, produces peace or justice (though some degree of stability is probably necessary). Thus it is one thing to criticize those who object to the U.K.'s deviation by arguing that morally the U.K., in its role as an official of the international legal order, ought not to adhere to the existing rule of recognition. 49 That criticism is distinct, While the foregoing argument demonstrates that existing customary international law rests on a rule of recognition, it may not suffice to prove that customary law (international or otherwise) can exist only in the presence of a rule of recognition.
Whether it is thought to entail this stronger conclusion will depend in part on one's assessment of the primitive social order described earlier, in which there is an overlap of beliefs regarding the legality of certain norms, though these beliefs have different bases. . 24 Ibid at 323-4; see Hart, supra note 7 at 231, and discussion of Hart's remark below. 25 Ibid at 323. 26 Ibid at 322-3. 27 I place the term 'abuse' in scare quotes to indicate that the concern lies not with the failure to adhere to the standards for creating legal rules, but rather with the purposes for which officials use their powers to do so. 31 See Franck, supra note 20 at 183-194. 32 In doing so, he transforms Hart's rule of recognition into something akin to Kelsen's
Grundnorm. Yet as was indicated above, Hart attributes law's normativity (as a descriptive matter) to the adoption of the internal point of view with respect to (particular) legal norms, rather than to the existence of a basic norm of the legal system.
In fairness to Franck, though, it should be noted that on a number of occasions in the chapter on international law, Hart speaks as if the concepts of a Grundnorm and a rule of recognition are equivalent.
